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INTRODUCTION

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.L'
-Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes

In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,' the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Puerto Rican
government's seizure without compensation of a pleasure yacht on

t Currently at Michael C. Black Law Offices, Ltd., Saint Paul, Minnesota. J.D.
1994, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
2. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

1

William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 21,LAW
Iss. 1 [2014],
Art. 15
WLLLAM
MITCHELL
REVE/W

[Vol. 21

which had been discovered a single marijuana cigarette.3 The yacht
had been leased to two Puerto Rican residents, one of whom was
charged with violation of the Puerto Rican Controlled Substances
Act.4 The Act provided for forfeiture of all vessels used to transport
controlled substances, including marijuana.' It was conceded that the
owner of the yacht was not guilty of any crime.6 He received no prior
notice of the seizure of the yacht, valued at approximately $20,000, 7
nor was he afforded a prior adversary hearing.8 He learned of the
seizure only when he attempted to repossess the yacht after the lessees
failed to make rent payments.9
Civil forfeiture statutes, like the one under which the yacht was
seized in Pearson Yacht, have become increasingly popular in recent
years. 10 In 1991, more than two billion dollars worth of property was

3.
The yacht was seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto
Rico, which subjected to forfeiture the following:
[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels,
which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment of property described in clauses (1) and (2) of this
subsection.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4) (1979). Marijuana is one of the controlled
substances described as property in clauses (1) and (2) of § 2512. Id. §§ 2512(a)(1)(2).

4.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665 (1974).
5.
Id. at 665-66. The statute under which the yacht was forfeited was P.R- LAWS
ANN. tit. 24, § 2101. Id. at 665. This statute is typical of legislation designed to combat
the increasing level of drug related crime in recent years. Although forfeiture statutes
usually target drug related activity, state and federal statutes also target pornography,
smuggling, tax evasion, gambling and other activities. See, e.g., John Brew, State and
Federal Fofeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 DICK. L REv. 461, 464
(1988); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592-1624 (1988) (targeting smuggling); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781789 (1988) (targeting contraband such as drugs, firearms, and counterfeit money); 26
U.S.C. §§ 7302-7321 (1988) (targeting violations of the Internal Revenue Code such as
gambling, counterfeiting, or distilling); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-30 (1994) (targeting
gambling); ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.195 (1994) (targeting fish and game violations); FLA.
STAT. ch. 849.36 (1994) (targeting gambling violations); 47 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6-601
(1994) (targeting liquor law violations).
6.
Pearson Yacht4 416 U.S. at 668.
7.
The value of the yacht was stated in a law review article. See Christine Meyer,
Zero Tolerancefor Forfeiture:A Callfor
Reform of CivilFofeitureLaw, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 853, 867 (1991).
8.
Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 667.
It was conceded that the owner of the yacht had no prior warning of the
9.
illegal activity of the lessees, nor had he in any way participated in the activity. Id. at
668. The lease agreement even contained a prohibition against the use of the yacht
for unlawful purposes. Id.
10.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784 (Supp. 1990); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 195.140-145 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODEANN. § 44-12-101 to -104 (1989); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3387-3388 (Consol. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 161.55 (West Supp.
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forfeited to the federal government." This popularity is in part a
reaction to the perceived over-expansion of constitutional rights for
criminals.' 2 Civil forfeiture statutes respond to this perception through
the device of an ancient common law fiction which allows the
government to treat property as capable of guilt." Because the
relevant inquiry then becomes only the guilt or innocence of the
property, and not the property owner, constitutional protections
traditionally afforded the individual have been circumvented. 4 As a
direct consequence, time-honored constitutional safeguards created to
protect individual rights have been effectively ignored. 5
Despite their popularity, civil forfeiture statutes would almost surely
be struck down as unconstitutional were it not for the courts'
continued reliance on an ancient common law doctrine that is no
longer relevant and is unrecognized in any other segment of our
society. 6 The courts have admitted as much themselves. For example,
in Pearson Yacht, the Supreme Court reluctantly concluded that the
forfeiture statute was constitutional because "[t]he historical background of forfeiture statutes in this country and this Court's prior
decisions sustaining their constitutionality lead to that conclusion. 7
The case reporters are replete with other decisions upholding the
constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes based merely on the
recognition that they have always been permitted in the past. 8 An

1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1049 (1977).

11.
Sandra Guerra, ReconcilingFederalAsset Foifeiturenand DrugOffense Sentenrcing,
78 MINN. L REv. 805, 826 & n.81 (1994).
12.
See Kelly McClure, Federal Civil Forfeiture of Assets: How it Works and Why It
Must, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. Rzv. 419,422-23(1991) (discussing the public dissatisfaction
with the limited success of federal criminal forfeiture statutes, particularly those
directed at drug trafficking); see also Comment, Civil Fofeiture ofAssets: A FinalSolution
to InternationalDrug Trafficking, 10 Hous.J. INT'L L 239, 252-53 (1988) (commenting
on the inability of criminal forfeiture legislation to effectively combat drug trafficking).
13.
For a discussion of the application and effect of the "guilty property" fiction,
see infra part U.B.
14.
For example, in Pearson Yacht the court noted that "[d]espite [the]
proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the innocence of the owner of property subject
to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense." Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
15.
See infra note 18.
See infra part ll.B. (discussing the legal fiction permitting the treatment of
16.
property as capable of guilt).
17.
Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 680.
18.
See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) ("It has long been
settled that statutory forfeiture[) of property... is not a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."); Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921) (stating that civil forfeitures are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to now be displaced"); United States v. Certain Real
Property and Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove, Babylon, New York, 954 F.2d 29, 33
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obvious objection to such a line of reasoning is that the original
grounds which justified civil forfeiture in the past have long since
disappeared. The "rule simply persists from imitation of the past."19
In Austin v. United States,20 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the obvious fact that property forfeiture has the effect of
punishing the owner.21 Proceeding from this premise, the Court ruled
for the first time that civil forfeitures are subject to constitutional
22
protection under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment

(2nd Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has long held that a forfeiture of property used
for illegal purposes may be deemed unduly oppressive only when the owner of the
forfeited property is innocent of the wrongful activity, uninvolved and unaware of it,
and has done 'all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.'");
United States v. Campos, 859 F.2d 1233, 1240 (6th Cir. 1988) ("After analysis of the
historical background and development of the law of forfeiture, innocence of the
owner of property was rejected as a defense to forfeiture despite the hardship
involved."); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, Vehicle I.D. No.
2F37M56101227, 621 F.2d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Courts applying the various
federal forfeiture statutes have 'almost uniformly' rejected innocence of the property's
owner as a defense to a government forfeiture action."); Associates Investment Co. v.
United States, 220 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1955) ("[I]t is well settled that [forfeiture]
is not a denial of due process of law, or a taking of private property for public use
without fair compensation.").
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457, 469
19.
(1897); see also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978);
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1960); Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289,
293 (2d Cir. 1977); Commercial Trading Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 466 F.2d 1239,
1242 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972).
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). In Austin the Court reversed and remanded an
20.
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which had
reluctantly held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. CL 2801, 2801 (1993). In United States
v. 508 Depot Stree4 the Eighth Circuit was reluctant to apply the Eighth Amendment
because it felt it was "limited by the technical legal distinctions regarding in personam
and in rem actions." United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir.
1992).
21.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12. For a detailed discussion of the facts and
holding of Austin, see infra part lV.
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive
22.
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

Since its decision in Austin, the Supreme Court has ruled that civil forfeitures are
also subject to constitutional protection under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See,
e.g., Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1944-45
(1994) (Fifth Amendment); United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.
Ct. 492, 498-501 (1994) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
In Kurth Ranch, six family members growing marijuana on their farm were arrested
and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to sell marijuana and, in the
alternative, possession with intent to sell. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943. The
marijuana was seized and destroyed. Id. at 1942. Each family member pleaded not
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guilty and eventually entered a plea bargain, resulting in two family members going to
jail. Id. Through a civil forfeiture action permitted by Montana law, the Kurths gave
up equipment and cash totalling more than $18,000. Id.
The Montana Department of Revenue then moved to assess the Kurths with a
statutorily permitted tax on dangerous drugs. Id. The tax was based upon the "market
value" of the marijuana that was seized, and assessed at $900,000 by the government.
Id. The Kurths subsequently filed for bankruptcy and the government's tax claim was
reassessed at $181,000. Id. at 1943.
Finding the tax to be approximately 400% of the actual market value of the
marijuana, the Supreme Court concluded that the tax assessment was unreasonably
high. Id. at 1946 n.17 & 1947. The Court further found the tax to be a criminal,
rather than civil, penalty due to its punitive nature. Id. at 1947. The tax could not be
assessed without the commission of an illegal act and, further, the tax was assessed
upon property that the defendants no longer possessed. Id. at 1948. The Court
considered this punitive government action constitutionally questionable. Id.
Two of the Kurth defendants were punished by both incarceration and forfeiture.
Id. The state action of additionally levying a tax, characterized by the Court as a
punishment, resulted in punishing the defendants twice for the same crime. The Court
held the tax to be a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia filed three separate
dissenting opinions. Id. at 1949-60 (Rehnquist & O'Connor & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
Their common objection was the majority's characterization of the drug tax as a
criminal penalty under a Double Jeopardy Clause analysis. Id.
In James Daniel Good, the defendant's house was raided by police in 1985. James
Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct at 497. A large quantity of marijuana and its byproducts was
recovered in the home. Id. Good pleaded guilty to promoting a harmful drug in the
second degree, in violation of Hawaii law. Id. Good forfeited more than three
thousand dollars in cash that police found in the house, was sentenced, and then fined.
Id.
In late 1989, using the federal forfeiture law for drug offenses, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (7), the federal government filed an in rem action in federal court. Id. The
government, in an ex parte proceeding, moved to obtain possession of Good's home
based upon the 1985 drug conviction. Id. A warrant was issued and the property was
seized without either prior notice or hearing to Good. Id. at 497-98. Good claimed a
lack of due process resulting from the forfeiture of his real property. Id. at 498. Not
insignificantly, the government had five years in which to move for a forfeiture under
the statute. Id.
The Court did not inquire as to whether either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments
operated to the exclusion of the other. Id. at 499. Rather, it considered the issue to
be whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments both applied. Id. The Court held that
Good was not limited to the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure. Id. at 500. The government's stated objective was to seize the
home and real property for possession, not for evidentiary purposes through its
forfeiture action. Id. at 497. Good's right to maintain his home, free from governmental interference was considered an important and historic element of the analysis. Id.
at 501. The Court found that "[t]he seizure of a home produces a far greater
deprivation than the loss of furniture, or even attachment." Id. at 501. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that Good was protected by the search and seizure protections of
the Fourth Amendment and the notice and hearing protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 500, 505.
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Although the Supreme Court reached the correct conclusion in
Austin, its reasoning reflects its continuing infatuation with ancient and
obsolete common law precepts. 3 The Court also explicitly declined
to formulate an Eighth Amendment constitutional test to be applied
to civil forfeitures; instead calling on the appellate courts to develop
their own test.24 It is therefore up to the lower courts to sever the
archaic ties connecting civil forfeiture with the common law.
This Comment attempts to answer the challenge issued in Austin to articulate a test to determine the constitutionality of civil forfeiture
statutes under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
It argues that a civil forfeiture should be declared excessive under the
Eighth Amendment if there is a disproportionate relationship between
the cost of the crime committed and the value of the property
forfeited.
Part II of this Comment traces the evolution of civil forfeiture law
from its common law ancestry up to the recent Supreme Court
decision in Austin. Part III analyzes the history of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Part IV explains the factual
background of Austin and carefully describes the Supreme Court's
decision of the case. Part V of this Comment analyzes the Austin
decision, criticizing it for declining to set forth a test for determining
the constitutionality of civil forfeitures under the Eighth Amendment.
Using Austin as the point of departure, this section suggests criteria for
determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive under
the Eighth Amendment. Part V concludes by applying the proposed
constitutional test to the facts of Austin and Pearson Yacht.
II.

HISTORY OF CIVIL FoRFErruRE LAw

The courts' continued acceptance of civil forfeiture statutes rests
largely on jurisdictional and precedential grounds. Both are rooted
in history and are based upon sound legal principles. However, in the

According to the Court, there were no exigent circumstances to support the
government's ex parte action to seize the property. Id. at 505. Therefore, under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court found a requirement to notify Good of the
forfeiture action and to permit him a hearing on the matter. Md With respect to the
timeliness of the forfeiture, the Court ruled that the government was within the
statutory period during which to file the action. Id. at 507. Thus, the forfeiture action
was not dismissed, despite the government's failure to comply with other
statutory requirements. Id. The Court ultimately remanded the case back to the
district court. Id.
23.
See infra part V.
24.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 ("Austin asks that we establish a multifactor test for
We decline that
determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally 'excessive.'
invitation ....
Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that
question in the first instance.").
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case of civil forfeiture statutes, they have been expanded by the courts
to the extent that their original purposes have been corrupted.
A.

The JurisdictionalElement of Civil ForfeitureLaw

Forfeiture of assets has been defined in modern times as follows:
the divesture without compensation of property used in a manner
contrary to the laws of the sovereign. Whenever a statute provides
that upon the commission of a specified act, certain property used
in or connected with that act shall be "forfeited," the forfeiture takes
place immediately upon the commission of the act, and a conditional right to the property then vests in the government.2
Civil forfeiture statutes derive their force from their jurisdictional
nature. Forfeiture statutes are either criminal or civil. The critical
distinction between criminal and civil forfeiture is the jurisdictional
requirement. Civil forfeiture requires in rem jurisdiction, orjurisdiction against the thing.26 Criminal forfeiture requires in personam
jurisdiction, or jurisdiction based on a person and involving personal
rights. 27 Criminal forfeitures therefore implicate the full panoply of
constitutional rights before property can be taken by the government.
Government prosecutors are able to circumvent these personal
constitutional protections by proceeding directly against the property.'8 The property is guilty if the government sustains its low burden
of showing merely that there is probable cause the property
was
29
connected with the commission of certain proscribed activity.
B.

English Common Law

There were three kinds of forfeiture recognized in the English
common law: escheat upon attainder, deodand, and statutory
forfeiture.'0 Although only statutory forfeiture is recognized today,

25.

United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1

(C.D. Cal. 1978).
26.
In remjurisdiction is the power to adjudicate claims against property or res.
Seegenerally I ROBERT C. CASAD,JuRisDIcrION IN CIVILACTIONS § 1.01 [3] (2d ed. 1991).
Personal jurisdiction over the owner of the property is not required for the application
of in rem jurisdiction. Id.
27.
In personam jurisdiction is the power to bind a person or adjudicate an
action involving the person. See generally id. § 1.01[2]. Personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is required for the application of in personam jurisdiction. Id. ("To
adjudicate an action in personam - i.e., an action seeking to impose upon the
defendants a duty to do, or refrain from doing, some specific act or to pay a sum of
money - a court must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.").
28.
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
29.
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.

30.

Lawrence A. Kasten, Extending ConstitutionalProtection to Civil Forfeitures That

Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 194, 198 & n.18 (1991)
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escheat upon attainder and deodand continue to "contribute[] to
modem conceptions of the state's ability to seize the property of its
citizens.""' In particular, the myth that property can be culpable of
crime, which underlies these doctrines, continues to be used as a
justification for bypassing constitutional rights of individuals.3 2
1. Escheat upon attainder
Escheat upon attainder, essentially a criminal law doctrine, was
premised on the common law theory that the sovereign retained a
superior interest in all property."3 If a subject committed a felony or
treason, any interest in property he or she owned escheated, or
reverted back, to the Crown at the time the felony was committed. 4
The commission of the felony also resulted in corruption of the
blood,33 so that any rights of the subject's innocent heirs were likewise
forfeited.3 6 Nevertheless, the primary function of escheat upon
attainder was to punish the property owner for committing a crime. 7
2. Deodand
The doctrine of the deodand is particularly relevant to understanding modem civil forfeiture law.3 ' Deodands are any objects which

(describing deodand and escheat upon attainder).
31.
Id. at 198.
32.
See Tamara R. Piety, ScorchedEarth: How the Expansion of CivilForfeitureDoctrine
Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L REv. 911, 918-19 (1991) (basing the
constitutionality of
civil forfeiture statutes on their entrenchment in case law).
33.
See Kasten, supranote 30, at 198.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. The effect of the doctrine of corruption of the blood was described by
the Supreme Court as follows:
The consequences of attainder were forfeiture of real and personal
estates and corruption of blood. An attainted person could not
inherit land or other hereditaments, nor retain those he possessed,
nor transmit them by descent to any heir. Descents were also
obstructed whenever posterity derived a tide through one who was
attainted.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 n.8 (1972)

(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

*380-81).
Kasten, supranote 30, at 198. Escheat upon attainder and corruption of the
36.
blood were abolished by the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. "The
Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted." Id.
37.
SeeAustin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2807 (1993); see also Kasten, supra
note 30, at 198-99.
38.
Although the deodand has never been recognized in the United States, the
Supreme Court has consistently used the deodand doctrine that property is capable of
guilt as a basis for upholding the constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes. See supra
COMMENTARIES
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directly cause the death of a person.

9

The doctrine of the deodand

can be traced back to the usage of "noxal surrender," which was widely
practiced during the rein of Alfred the Great in the late ninth
century." Noxal surrender occurred by surrendering the object which
caused the death to the victim's family.4 The purpose was not to
make restitution but "as a ransom by the owner of the wrong-doing
chattel in order to forestall further action by the injured party."42
The custom of noxal surrender was also recognized in Roman law and

African tribal law.4
At English common law, the doctrine of the deodand was practiced

differently than the custom of noxal surrender."

Under the English

common law, it was immaterial whether the object was owned by the

deceased or someone else. 5 Unlike escheat upon attainder, the goal
behind the institution of the deodand was not to punish the property
owner for the commission of a crime. Instead, the deodand doctrine
was premised on the fiction that property itself, distinct from the
conduct of its owner, could be guilty of committing a crime.46 If any
property directly or indirectly resulted in the accidental death of a
subject, the value of that property was forfeited to the sovereign,
regardless of the property owner's fault. 7 For example, a sword which

note 18; see also infra part II.C (discussing the history of civil forfeiture law in the
United States).
39. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox." Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. LQ. 169, 185
(1973); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, which means "given to God." Finkelstein,
supra, at 180 n.35; Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY
436 (6th ed. 1990) (defining deodand as "any personal chattel which was the
immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature, and which was forfeited
to the crown to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by the high almoner").
40.
Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 181.
Id.
41.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 181-82.
44.
Id. at 182.
45.
Id.
Kasten, supra note 30, at 199-200. The different rationales underlying the
46.
doctrines of escheat upon attainder and the deodand resulted in separate procedural
requirements. "Forfeiture consequent to attainder required an underlying criminal
conviction, and was, therefore, an additional in personam sanction against the
individual and, vicariously, against the individual's heirs-apparent. Deodand forfeiture,
however, was essentially in rem, with only the guilt or innocence of the property at
issue." Id. at 200 (footnotes omitted).
47.
The property was forfeited even in circumstances where the owner of the
object which caused the death was the hapless victim. Finkelstein, supra note 39, at
182, 197. The value of the deodand object was assessed and the proceeds given to the
Crown. Id. at 185.
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caused the death of a person would be forfeited to the Crown,
whether or not the sword's owner played any part in the death.48
Deodand, therefore, was premised only on the guilt or innocence of
the property itself, with no intent, at least at the time of the doctrine's
origin, to punish the owner. 9 There was, however, a remedial
purpose behind the doctrine of the deodand. The King was to
contribute the value of the property to charity or it was to be used to
provide money to say Mass for the victim's soul." ° The original
charitable purpose of deodand gradually disappeared, and it instead
became a source of revenue for the Crown.5 Its continued application was justified as a penalty for the negligence of the owner,5 2 on the
grounds "for tho it was not his crime but his misfortune, yet because
the king hath lost his subject, and that men may be more careful, he
forfeits his goods ..

.

The deodand continued as a common law doctrine in England
through the end of the 18th century largely because the incidents of
accidental death were rare and the victims were from the poorest class
of persons. 4 However, when the industrial age arrived at the
beginning of the 19th century, "[p]ersons of all classes became
potential and actual victims of injury and death, a situation which

48.
"Where a man killeth another with the sword ofJohn at Stile, the sword shall
be forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAw 23 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (citations omitted). Sm also
Finkelstein, supranote 39, at 223 (noting the similarity between Holmes' statement and
the policyjustifications put forth by the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality
of civil forfeiture statutes).
49.
The Supreme Court in Austin observed that the deodand served, at least in
part, to punish the negligence of the owner. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2806 (1993) (quoting 1 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152).
50.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
The charitable purpose behind the deodand of providing mass for the benefit
51.
of the decedent's soul was justified on the grounds that the soul of the dead man had
greater priority than any claim by survivors. Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 182. This
original purpose of the deodand "was soon given up, so that the deodand already at
an early date was little more than a source of revenue for whosoever had been
designated as the public beneficiary." Id.
See PearsonYacht, 416 U.S. at 681. Despite the different groundsjustifying the
52.
continued existence of the deodand, it was always solely a Crown Plea and never a basis
for a private cause of action. Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 178. The rationale behind
the institution of the deodand was the Judeo-Christian "'revulsion' against computing
the 'value' of human life in pecuniary terms ... ." Id. at 179-80.
53.
Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 186 (citing MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, 477 (W. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., 1847)); see aLso Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806
('[S] uch misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore
he is properly punished by such forfeiture.") (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *301).
54.
Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 171-72.
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rapidly grew more critical with the advent of railroads in the 1830s."15
As a result, "[r]ich as well as poor were now frequent victims of
accidental death, but the law proved an ineffective remedy for
surviving kin seeking recovery for manifest damages resulting from the
deaths, and few bothered to bring any suit at all." 6 On August 18,
1846, legislation was passed that finally abolished the institution of
deodand s7 Although deodand itself was abolished, its remedial
purpose continues as a justification for civil forfeiture.5 8
3.

Forfeitureby statute

The final type of forfeiture law practiced in England, which survives
today, was forfeiture by statute.5 9 These statutes, most notably the
Navigation Act of 16 6 0,' provided for the forfeiture "of offending
objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws-likely a
product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and

55. Id. at 172.
56.
Id. Finkelstein also notes that "[t]he life insurance industry, which today
absorbs the largest part of the economic costs of such contingencies, was then in its
infancy, and recovery at common law was shut off. Only the deodand was available as
a legal 'remedy' .... " I&
57.
Id. at 170. A few days later the "Act for Compensating the Families of
Persons Killed by Accidents," known as "Lord Campbell's Act" was enacted. Id, at 17071. Although the deodand was not available as a private right of action, it was viewed
as protecting private individuals by providing a disincentive to negligence by property
owners. Id. at 171-73. For this reason, Lord Campbell advocated that the act
abolishing deodands be enacted together with Lord Campbell's Act:
The two bills might go on together because, objectionable as the
system of deodands was, he [i.e. Lord Campbell] would not abolish
it, having regard to public safety, unless the right action was given,
in order to make railroad directors and stage coach proprietors
cautious of the lives and limbs of Her Majesty's subjects.
Id. at 171 (citing 77 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 1031 (1846)) (bracketed text
in original).
58.
See cases cited supra note 18. Civil forfeiture statutes are also used to fund
the government's so-called "war on drugs." In 1991, President Bush acknowledged this
additional purpose when
he stated that "[a]sset forfeiture laws allow us to take the ill-gotten gains of drug
m
kingpins and use them to put more cops on the streets and more prosecutors in court.
"
Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture,Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J. CiM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 274, 275 (1992) (citing President George Bush, Remar*s ByPresidmtBush
to Attorney General'sSummit on Law Enforcement: Responses to Violent Crime,Fed. News Serv.,
Mar. 5, 1991); see also Guerra, supra note 11, at 824-26 (describing the incentives of
muldjurisdictional cooperation and the creation of new revenues for law enforcement
agencies).
59. See Kasten, supra note 30, at 198 & n.18.
60. An Act for the encouraging and increasing of shipping and navigation, 1660,
12 Car. 2, ch. 18 (Eng.); see Austin v. United States, 113 S.CL 2801, 2807 (1993); see
also Kasten, supra note 30, at 198 n.18 (citing authorities).
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the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer."6 1 For example, the Navigation Act of 1660 provided that
if the acts of individual sailors resulted in the illegal shipping of
commodities, the entire ship could be forfeited. 2 This was true even
if the individual sailors acted without the knowledge of the ship's
owner 6l because the Act, like most statutory forfeitures of the time,
merely required in rem jurisdiction.' Thus, forfeiture by statute is
essentially the deodand doctrine encoded into statute.
C.

Civil Forfeiture in the United States

Of the three kinds of forfeiture recognized in the English common
65
law, only statutory forfeiture is recognized in the United States. Civil
forfeiture pursuant to statute was established early in the country's
history"[L]ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common law
courts in the Colonies - and later in the states during the period
of Confederation - were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the
enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes," which
provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels used in
violations of customs and revenue laws. And almost immediately
after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in
customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture under federal law,
as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign countries, and
somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country.66
Two of the earliest Supreme Court cases in the United States which

upheld civil forfeiture statutes were The Palmyra67 and Harmony v.
United States' ("Malek Adhel. In The Palmyra, decided in 1827, a ship
had been used to commit numerous acts of piracy against other ships.
The Court upheld the forfeiture of the ship under a federal customs
forfeiture law69 despite acknowledging that its owner was blameless.

61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
of which

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
Navigation Act, 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch. 18 § I(3); see Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 682.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 683 (bracketed text in original) (citations omitted).
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844) [hereinafter Makk Adhel].
The forfeiture of the ship was based on a federal statute, the second section
authorized the President to do the following-:
to instruct the commanders of public armed vessels of the United
States, to seize, subdue and send into any port of the United States,
any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat, the crew whereof
shall be armed, and which shall have attempted or committed any
piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure, upon
any vessel of the United States, or of the citizens thereof, or upon
any other vessel.
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The Court reasoned that the culpability of the owner of the ship was
not relevant because "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing." 0
Thus, very early in this country's history, in rem proceedings stood
"independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding
in personami" ' More ominously, the fiction that property could be
tainted with guilt was resurrected.
In Malek Adhe472 decided in 1844, the insane captain of the ship had
fired at numerous other ships that his ship encountered during the
voyage.7 ' Despite the conceded innocence of the ship's owners,' the
Court stated that:
the act makes no exception whatsoever, whether the aggression be
with or without the co-operation of the owners. The vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty
instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any
reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner...
Nor is there any thing new in a provision of this sort. It is not an
uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations,
to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew
thereof, a wrong or offence has been done as the offender, without
any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility
of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the
case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or
wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party.75

Malek Adhel illustrates the reasoning other courts would follow in
years to come.7 6 First, the Court repeated the common law fiction that
guilt can attach to property apart from the guilt or innocence of the

The fourth section provided:
that whenever any vessel or boat from which any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure, shall have been first
attempted or made, shall be captured and brought into any port of
the United States, the same shall and may be adjudged and
condemned to their use, and that of the captors, after due process
and trial, in any court having admiraltyjurisdiction, and which shall
be holden for the district into which such captured vessel shall be
brought, and the same court shall thereupon order a sale and
distribution thereof accordingly, and at their discretion.
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1927) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 75).
Id. at 14.
70.
71.
Id. at 15.
72.
The same federal customs statute was involved as was in The Palmyra. Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 229 (1844).
73.
Id. at 228-29.
74.
"It was fully admitted in the court below, that the owners of the brig and
cargo never contemplated or authorized the acts complained of." Id. at 230.
75.
Id. at 233.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
76.
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owner." Second, the Court justified its reliance on this fiction by
pointing to its historical acceptance.7" Finally, the Court pointed to
the legislative intent behind the law, explaining that it was "the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong. " 79
After the Civil War, civil forfeiture statutes continued to be used in
civil in rem proceedings to uphold the forfeiture of property in cases
involving tax revenue violations.8° In Dobbins's Distillery v. United
1
States,"
a distillery was leased to the defendant who, unknown to the
owner, had violated provisions of the Tax Revenue Act.82 The civil
forfeiture statute provided for forfeiture despite the innocence or lack
of knowledge of the owner.8" Nevertheless, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, ruling that the distillery itself was guilty,
irrespective of any actions taken by the owner.8 4 In J W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co. v. United States,"' decided forty-four years after Dobbins's
Distillery, the Court once again upheld the punitive use of in rem
forfeitures, stating that the guilty property fiction was "too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced." 6 As one commentator remarked, "Dobbins'sDistillery and
J W. Goldsmith deeply entrenched the guilty property fiction and
broadened
the scope of punitive sanctions using civil in rem proce8
dures." 1
The Supreme Court has not completely neglected to apply
constitutional principles to civil forfeiture statutes. In 1886 the Court,
in Coffey v. United States,8s held that the Fifth Amendment's protection
against double jeopardy89 applied when a forfeiture action was
attempted against a defendant previously acquitted on a criminal
charge based on the same act.' ° Following Coffey, the Court in Boyd v.

77.
78.

Malek Adhe4 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233.
Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 233.
Kasten, supra note 30, at 201.
96 U.S. 395 (1877).
Dobbin's Distillery v. United States 96 U.S. 395, 396-97 (1877).

83.
Id. at 399-400.
84.
Id. at 401. The Court also stated that, because the forfeiture was pursuant
to statute, it was required to give deference to congressional intent. Id.
85.
254 U.S. 505 (1921).
86.
J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
87.
Kasten, supra note 30, at 202.
88.
116 U.S. 436 (1886).
89.
The DoubleJeopardy Clause provides: "[N] or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... " U.S. CONST. amend.
V, cl. 2.
90.
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 445 (1886). In Coffey, the defendant
had been acquitted of an in personam criminal count for defrauding the government
of tax revenue. Id. at 442-43. The Court felt that this acquittal barred the in rem civil
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United States,9' decided in the same year, held that defendants in

forfeiture actions were also protected by the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against self-incrimination. 9"
The major civil forfeiture statute employed by the federal government in recent years is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act ("Act" or "the Act"), enacted in 1970. 91 The Act, in
many ways, perpetuates the ancient doctrine of the deodand
Actions brought pursuant to its terms are in rem proceedings against
the property. 5 Because it is an in rem proceeding, the innocence of
the owner will have little or no effect on the outcome of the proceeding. 6 Upon forfeiture, title to the "offending" property is automatically vested in the United States. 97 Title to the property relates back

count because it involved the same parties and the same matter and issues as in the
criminal action. Id. at 444-45.
91.
116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd the government had compelled the defendant
to produce an invoice for merchandise imported without the required payment of
duties. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1886). The Court held that the
order requiring production of the invoice was unconstitutional because it was
equivalent to compelling the defendant to be a witness against himself, regardless of
the in rem nature of the proceedings. Id. at 633-34.
92.
Id. at 638. The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination
provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S.
CONST. amend. V, cl. 3. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's post-Austin
application of the Fifth Amendment to civil forfeiture law, see supra note 22.
93.
21 U.S.C § 881 (1988). For the text of the forfeiture provisions of the act,
see infra note 141. See aLsoJeffrey M. Evans, "Civil"Forfeitures Under State Rico Laws: A
Legislative Attempt to Circumvent the Constitution, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 293 (1986) (discussing
Florida and Oregon state forfeiture statutes modeled after 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, the
federal statute known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO").
94.
See generally Stahl, supra note 58.
95.
See, e.g., Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509 (1921)
(finding a car itself guilty and subject to forfeiture); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d
869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding); United
States v. Haro, 685 F. Supp. 1468, 1473 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (stating that the property is
the defendant in a civil forfeiture proceeding).
96.
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684-86 (citing
multiple cases for the proposition that when property is forfeited by statute, the
innocence of the owner has been uniformly rejected). The Act, unlike many forfeiture
statutes, does provide for an innocent owner's defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C),
(a) (6)-(7) (1988). However, Pearson Yacht also considered the innocence of the owner
whose yacht was forfeited. The Court read such a defense very restrictively, implying
that the owner was required to prove that it "did all that it reasonably could to avoid
having its property put to an unlawful use." Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 690; see also
Sandini, 816 F.2d at 872 (stating that the innocence of the property owner is irrelevant
in civil forfeiture cases).
97.
21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
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to the time at which the criminal activity occurred. 8 The owner of the
property has the burden of proof to establish the innocence of the
property by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 As a result of these
harsh requirements imposed on property owners, forfeiture proceedings under the Act have skyrocketed in recent years.'0 ° In 1992, $531
million in cash and property was seized by the government under the
Act.'0 ' Eighty percent of those property owners were never even
02
charged with a crime.

98.
Id.; see also United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) (stating that
forfeiture under statute constitutes transfer of property to government at time offense
is committed); Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676
(5th Cir. 1960) (stating that property vests in government at moment illegal act is
committed); United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195
& n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that government's title vests at the time of the
commission of the illegal act).
99.
Because of this lower burden of proof, forfeiture statutes are more likely to
be successfully prosecuted. The statutes, therefore, provide a tempting alternative to
criminal statutes, fueling the government's increasing likelihood of using the civil
proceeding as a replacement for a criminal proceeding. See, eg., United States v. Four
Million, Two-Hundred Fifty Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 907 (11th Cir.) ("[I]t is the
claimant's responsibility to prove the absence of actual knowledge [of improper acts or
omissions under 21 U.S.C. § 881]."), cert. denie, 474 U.S. 1056 (1985).
100.
Since its inception in 1970, more than 1,600 federal cases have cited 21
U.S.C. § 881. See, e.g., United States v. $5,000 in U.S. Currency, 40 F.3d 846, 847 (6th
Cir. 1994); United States v. U.S. Currency, 39 F.3d 1039, 1040 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. One
1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 37 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chandler, 36
F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fifty-Two Thousand & Eight Hundred
Dollars in U.S. Currency and Interest, 33 F.3d 1337, 1338 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. One
Parcel of Land, 33 F.3d 11, 12 (5th Cir. 1994); see also HenryJ. Reske, A Law Run Wdd:
ConservativeLawmaker Seeks Asset Forfeiture Limits, A.BA J., Oct. 1993, at 24-26. One
commentator describes the potency of civil forfeiture law as follows:
Seizing a person's car, boat or land under civil forfeiture law, under
the guise that it is the property which is at fault, is an extremely
potent weapon for law enforcement. 'Through this statute [21
U.S.C. § 881], Congress has expanded the nation's war on drugs to
every piece of real property involved in the narcotics trade.' Unlike
criminal forfeiture, the property may be taken by showing merely
a preponderance of evidence, (more likely than not), and is taken
before any criminal proceedings are instituted, much less before
any determination of guilt has been made. In criminal forfeiture
proceedings ... the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt, (meaning virtual certainty), and, of course, there are
numerous Constitutional safeguards to protect the defendant
during the course of the proceedings. As one commentator has
noted, civil forfeitures 'have the effect of punishing crime without
criminal process.'
Meyer, supra note 7, at 867-68 (citations omitted).
101.
Reske, supra note 100, at 24.
102.
Id.
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III. HISTORY OF THE ExcESsvE FINES CLAUSE
Despite the limited and uncertain constitutional protections
afforded persons subject to civil forfeiture statutes, the Austin decision
suggests that it is the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
that will offer the best source of protection in the future. The Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.""5

The meaning of

the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment has been left
largely uninterpreted by the Supreme Court for most of this country's
history."M When the Excessive Fines Clause was considered, it was
considered only in relation to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, which is also contained in the Eighth Amendment.0 5 Only
recently was the Excessive Fines Clause considered in isolation from
the rest of the Amendment.
The first extended analysis of the Clause occurred in Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Keco Disposa4 Inc. 10 6 At issue in Kelco was a jury award in
a state antitrust claim of six million dollars in punitive damages.'0 7
The Court found that Eighth Amendment protection has never been
applied to limit awards of punitive damages between private parties." 8 According to the Court, the protections afforded by the Eighth
Amendment are implicated only in cases concerned with criminal
process or in direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment."° The Court did not, however, decide whether the Eighth
Amendment applies only to criminal cases." 0 The Court restricted its
holding to deciding only that the Eighth Amendment "does not

103.
104.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
In the cases in which the Supreme Court has found that the Excessive Fines

Clause was or may be applicable, it nevertheless rejected claims that the particular fines
at issue were not excessive within the meaning of the Clause. See gneraUy Badders v.
United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910);
Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1866); Ex Parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568 (1833);
David B. Sweet, Annotation, Supreme Court'sConstructionand Application ofExcesive Fines
Clause of Federal Constitution'sEighth Amendment 106 L Ed. 2d 729 (1992).
105.
Sweet, supra note 104, at 730 n.1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment provides: "[N]or cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. An analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a thorough discussion of the

Clause, see Anthony Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
OriginalMeaning CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
106.
492 U.S. 257 (1989).
107.
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989).
108.
Id. at 260.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 263-64.
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constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded."'
In Kelco, the Supreme Court undertook an historical analysis of the
purposes and concerns of the Eighth Amendment." 2 The Court
noted that the Eighth Amendment received little attention at the time
it was enacted by the First Congress.113 The Excessive Fines Clause
received even less attention." 4 In particular, the First Congress did
not explain the meaning of the term "fines," nor did it discuss whether
the prohibition against excessive fines should apply in the civil
context.15 Despite this lack of direct evidence of what Congress
intended the meaning and purpose of the Clause to be, the Court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence that
the Clause was not
6
applicable to an award of punitive damages)
The Kelco Court based its conclusion on the historical distinction
between criminal fines and civil damages. The Eighth Amendment
was derived from Article I, section nine of the Virginia Declaration of

111.
Id. at 264.
112.
Id. at 262-276. "The same basic mode of inquiry should be applied in
considering the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause as is proper in other Eighth
Amendment contexts. We look to the origins of the Clause and the purposes which
directed its Framers." Id. at 264 n.4.
113.
Id. at 264.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 265. The discussion of the Eighth Amendment by the First Congress
was limited to legislators expressing their concern that the Amendment was
unnecessary and imprecise. The Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, primarily
concerning itself with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, recounted the
limited debate occasioned by the Amendment:
Mr. Smith of South Carolina "objected to the words 'nor cruel and
unusual punishment,' the import of them being to indefinite." Mr.
Livermore opposed the adoption of the clause, saying"The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on
which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have
no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant
by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What
is understood by excessive fines? It lays with the court to
determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be
inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off;
but are we, in future, to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode
of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission
of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the
legislature to adopt it, but until we have some security that this
will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind."
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable
majority. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910).
116.
Kelco, 492 U.S. at 265.
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Rights.' 7 The Virginia Declaration was a verbatim adoption of the
English Bill of Rights,1 and the English Bill of Rights was adopted in
1689 as a reaction against the excessive fines imposed by English
judges during the 1680s." 9 Reasoning that the First Congress was
aware of the history of the English Bill of Rights, the Court determined that "the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the
potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not
concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages."1" Therefore,
"the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only
those fines
2
directly imposed by, and payable to, the government."1 1
The Supreme Court in Keko specifically left open the question
whether the Excessive Fines Clause should be applied to cases where

117.
Id. at 266 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983)).
"Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689... states that 'excessive Bail
118.
ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
Punishments inflicted.'" Id (citing 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. 440, 441
(1689)).
119.
Id. at 267.
120.
Id. at 266.
121.
Id. at 268. The Petitioners argued unsuccessfully that the history of the
Eighth Amendment should be traced back even further to the time prior to the Magna
Carta. Id. at 268-69. The Magna Carta provided:
A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the
manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greamess
thereof, saving to him his contenement; (2) and a Merchant
likewise, saving to him his Merchandise; (3) and any other's villain
than ours shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage, if he falls
into our mercy. (4) And none of the said amerciaments [sic] shall
be assessed, but by the oath of honest and lawful men of the
vicinage. (5) Earls and Barons shall not be amerced but by their
Peers, and after the manner of their offence. (6) No man of the
Church shall be amerced after the quantity of his spiritual Benefice,
but after his Lay-tenement, and after the quantity of his offence.
Id. at 270 n.14 (citing Magna Charta, 9 Hen. Ill, ch. 14 (1225)); see also id. at 288
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Amercements were payments to the Crown, and were required of individuals who
were 'in the King's mercy,' because of some act offensive to the Crown." Id. at 269.
The Petitioners argued that because amercements were civil in nature and the Magna
Carta was a forerunner to the Eighth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment must
therefore be read as applicable to punitive damages. Jl at 268. The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Petitioners' interpretation of the Magna Carta:
[The Magna Carta is] aimed at putting limits on the power of the
King, on the "tyrannical extortions, under the name of amercements, with which John had oppressed his people," whether that
power be exercised for purposes of oppressing political opponents,
for raising revenue in unfair ways, or for any other improper use.
These concerns are clearly inapposite in a case where a private
party receives exemplary damages from another party, and the
government has no share in the recovery.
Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted). Cf. id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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the government has prosecuted the action or has a right to a share of
the proceeds.'2 The Court did, however, provide a framework to
guide future courts in analyzing the scope of the Excessive Fines
Clause. The primary consideration emphasized by the Court was an
inquiry into the historical purposes and concerns of the Eighth
Amendment to determine the intentions of the Framers of the Bill of
Rights. 123 Such an inquiry led the Court to conclude that the purpose
of the Eighth Amendment was to limit the government's power to
punish. 2 4 Because Kelco did not involve the government directly, the
Court found it unnecessary to decide what constituted punishment for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment."
What constituted punishment was addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Halper.26 At issue in that case was
whether a civil penalty imposed for filing a false claim with the
government, after a criminal conviction for the same offense,
constituted a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1'7 The United States argued that
punishment can be meted out only in criminal proceedings. 128 In
rejecting this argument, the Court held that whether the proceedings
are criminal or civil is not dispositive.' Instead, the relevant inquiry
is whether the civil sanction serves only a remedial function, as
opposed to a deterrent or retributive function." s A sanction is not
remedial if, as a matter of statutory construction, the civil sanction can

122.
Id. at 263-64. The Supreme Court also left open the question of whether the
Clause applies to qui tam actions where a private party brings an action on behalf of the
government and is entitled to share in the proceeds. Id. at 275-76 & 276 n.21.
123.
Id. at 264 n.4.
124.
Id. at 266 (stating that the "focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential
for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power").
125.
See i. at 276-77.
126.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
127.
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440.41 (1989).
128.
Id. at 441.
129.
Id. at 442-43.
130.
Id. at 448-49. The Court did not articulate a bright line test for determining
whether a civil sanction served a remedial function or a deterrent or retributive
function. However, the Court conceded that the trial court's judgment may be
arbitrary:
While the trial court'sjudgment in these matters often may amount
to no more than an approximation, even an approximation will go
far towards ensuring both that the Government is fully compensated for the costs of corruption and that, as required by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the defendant is protected from a sanction so
disproportionate to the damages caused that it constitutes a second
punishment.
Id. at 450.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss1/15

20

1995]

CL Replacing
FORURE
LAW Law with a Common Sens
Lieske: Civil Forfeiture Law:
the Common

only be construed as partly serving a retributive or deterrent purpose. " '
If it did, then it "is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term."' As a result the Court held that "under the
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished
in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. "133
Civil forfeiture statutes provided the opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address issues left unresolved by the Halper and Kelco
decisions; specifically, whether the Excessive Fines Clause should be
applied to civil damages awarded to the government, and, if so,
whether damages imposed under civil forfeiture statutes partially serve
to punish the property owner. The opportunity to resolve both of
these issues was presented to the Court in Austin v. United States.12
IV

AUSTIN V. UNITED STATES

A.

The Facts
OnJune 13,1990, Richard Austin sold Keith Engebretson two grams
of cocaine at Austin's auto body shop.lss Prior to the sale Austin hads
stopped at his mobile home, presumably to procure the cocaine.' 6
Austin subsequently was indicted on four counts of violating South
Dakota's drug laws." 7 He pleaded guilty to a single count of possessing cocaine with intent to distributess and was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment.'3 9
One month after being sentenced, the United States filed a civil
forfeiture proceeding in federal district court against Austin's auto
body shop and mobile home.'O The government proceeded under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.141 The

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 448-49.
113 S. CL 2801 (1993).
United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992).
Id.

137.
138.
139.

Id. at 816.
Id.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).

140.

Id.

141.
See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (describing the Act's
connection with the deodand doctrine). The Act, also known as the Controlled
Substances Act, was enacted in 1978 because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the
forfeiture provisions of earlier statutes. See McClure, supra note 12, at 423. The
forfeiture provisions of the Act read as follows:
§ 881. FORFEITURES
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Act provided for the forfeiture of personal property and real estate
used in the commission of certain drug-related crimes.142 The
government moved for summary judgment on the forfeiture, which

(a) SUBJECT PROPERTY
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in
violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of
any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing,
or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this
subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use,
as a container for property described in paragraph (1)

[or] (2) ....

(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1), [or] (2) ....

(5) All books, records, and research, including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or
intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities,
or other things of value furnished or intended to be
furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used
to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that
no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent
of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, tide, and
interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of
any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. III 1991).
142.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
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the district court granted. 143 Austin appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Austin argued that the seizure of his business and home by the
government violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment on the grounds that "the value of the property forfeited
was 'grossly disproportionate' to the illegal drugs located, and the
illegal activity occurring, on the property.""' The Eighth Circuit
Court, feeling itself constrained by well-established precedent,
disagreed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil
forfeitures.' 5 The court justified its holding, and prior precedent, by
referring to the in rem nature of civil forfeitures.'" Since Austin's
guilt or innocence was not constitutionally relevant in an in rem
proceeding, "the constitution hardly requires proportionality review. " "' As such, whether Austin's punishment was excessive in light
of the severity of the illegal conduct was irrelevant to the court.'"
Despite the Eighth Circuit's refusal to engage in a proportionality
analysis, it made clear its displeasure for the consequences faced by
individuals based on "[1]egal niceties such as in rem and in personam.""' Although the court did not condone drug-related criminal
activities, it was "troubled by the government's view that any property,
whether it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be
seized by the government because the owner, regardless of his or her

Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2803. The Court described the sequence of events that
143.
led to the trial court's entry of summary judgment as follows:
On February 4, 1991, the United States made a motion,
supported by an affidavit from Sioux Falls Police Officer Donald
Satterlee, for summaryjudgment. According to Satterlee's affidavit,
Austin met Keith Engebretson at Austin's body shop on June 13,
1990, and agreed to sell cocaine to Engebretson. Austin left the
shop, went to his mobile home, and returned to the shop with two
grams of cocaine which he sold to Engebretson. State authorities
executed a search warrant on the body shop and mobile home the
following day. They discovered small amounts of marijuana and
cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700 in cash. In opposing summary judgment, Austin
argued that forfeiture of the properties would violate the Eighth
Amendment. The District Court rejected this argument and
entered summary judgment for the United States.
Id.
144. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 817-18.
147.
Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at 818. For a discussion of in rem and in personamjurisdiction, see supra
Part HA
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past criminal record, engages in a single drug transaction."5 ° The
court went on to say:
In this case it does appear that the government is exacting too high
a penalty in relation to the offense committed, but we are limited by
the technical legal distinctions regarding in personam and in rem
actions, together with the clear court decisions that the Constitution
does not require proportionality - at least, not in civil proceedings
for the forfeiture of property.'
The court concluded by calling on Congress to incorporate proportionality safeguards into the Act."' 2 Austin53 appealed and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court's Holding and Analysis
The Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that the
question was whether the forfeiture was civil or criminal.'5 4 Proceeding from Kelco and Halper,the Court held first, that the Excessive Fines
Clause can apply to a civil in rem proceeding,' and second, that civil
forfeiture statutes can serve to punish owners of property.'5 6 Accordingly, a unanimous Supreme Court'5 7 reversed the judgment of the
Clause of the Eighth
Eighth Circuit, holding that the Excessive Fines
58
Amendment does apply to civil forfeitures.
In determining that the Eighth Amendment was intended by the
Framers of the Constitution to apply to civil proceedings, the Court
reasoned that, unlike some provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
language of the Eighth Amendment is not expressly limited to
criminal proceedings.' To illustrate, the Court contrasted the Eighth
and Fifth Amendments. For example, the Self-Incrimination Clause
B.

of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ...

shall be

Id. at 818.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). Prior to Austin, only the
153.
Second Circuit recognized the Eighth Amendment as applying to in rem civil
forfeitures. Id. at 2804. The other circuits interpreted prior Supreme Court decisions
as indicating that the Amendment did not apply. Id. The Supreme Court granted

certiorari because of this apparent conflict with its prior decisions. Id.
154. Id. at 2806.
155. Id. at 2812.
156. Id. at 2813-14.
157. There were two concurring opinions. Justice Scalia concurred in part and
concurred in thejudgment. Id. at 2812 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, with
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2812.
159. Id. at 2804-05.
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compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."" 6
Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment's history suggests that it was not
intended to apply only to criminal proceedings. 6' The Court noted:
"Consideration of the Eighth Amendment immediately followed
consideration of the Fifth Amendment. After deciding to confine
the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to
the Eighth Amendment. There were no proposals to limit that
Amendment to criminal proceedings . ... " Section 10 of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 is not expressly limited to criminal
cases either. The original draft of § 10 as introduced in the House
of Commons did contain such a restriction, but only with respect to
the bail clause: "The requiring excessive Bail of Persons committed
in criminal Cases, and imposing excessive Fines, and illegal Punishments, to be prevented." The absence of any similar restriction in
the other two clauses suggests that they were not limited to criminal
cases. In the final version, even the reference to criminal cases in
the bail clause was omitted. 6
Based on these observations, the Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment did apply to civil in rem proceedings.s
Relying on Halper," the Supreme Court then addressed the
question of whether the particular forfeiture at issue was punishment."s
More specifically, the Court inquired into the history of
forfeiture to determine "whether, at the time the Eighth Amendment
was ratified, forfeiture was understood at least in part as punishment
and whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) [of the Act]
should be so understood today." 166 The Court concluded that civil
forfeiture statutes in the United States have historically been enacted,

160.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court also referred to the Sixth Amendment,
stating that its provisions "are explicitly confined to 'criminal prosecutions.'" Austin,
113 S. Ct. at 2804. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall

have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
wimesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
161.
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264
(1989); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-92 (1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
668 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
162.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 (citations omitted).

163.

Id. at 2806.

164.
165.

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.

166.

Id.
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at least in part, to punish the property owner. 16 The Court based this
conclusion on its analysis of forfeiture law as it existed in England at
the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified.s The doctrine of the
deodand was partially justified as punishment for negligence.' 69
Escheat upon attainder was specifically addressed to criminal violations. 0 Finally, statutory forfeiture contained aspects of deodand and
escheat upon attainder and was understood as penal.' Therefore, the
Court concluded that the common law doctrines of deodand, escheat
upon attainder, and statutory forfeiture were all "understood, at least
in part, as imposing punishment.""7 The Court similarly concluded
that civil forfeiture in the United States has historically been recognized as imposing punishment.'
167.
Id. at 2809-10.
168.
Id. at 2806.
169.
Id.
170.
Id. at 2806-07.
171.
Id. at 2807.
172.
Id. at 2806.
173.
In particular, the Court referred to laws passed by the First Congress, stating
that such laws suggested the First Congress understood forfeiture to be punishment.
Id. at 2807. Specifically, the Court referred to a law passed by the First Congress in
1789, which provided:
[A]nd if the master or commander of any ship or vessel shall suffer
or permit the same, such master and commander, and every other
person who shall be aiding or assisting in landing, removing,
housing, or otherwise securing the same, shall forfeit and pay the
sum of four hundred dollars for every offence; shall moreover be
disabled from holding any office of trust or profit under the United
States, for a term not exceeding seven years; and it shall be the duty
of the collector of the district, to advertise the names of all such
persons in the public gazette of the State in which he resides,
within twenty days after each respective conviction. And all goods,
wares and merchandise, so landed or discharged, shall become
forfeited, and may be seized by any officer of the customs; and
where the value thereof shall amount to four hundred dollars, the
vessel, tackle, apparel and furniture, shall be subject to like
forfeiture and seizure.
Id. at 2807-08 (citing 1 Stat. 39 § 12 (1789)). The Court found significant the statute's
inclusion of forfeiture with the other provisions of punishment, such as the $400 fine
(the statute employs the word forfeit instead of fine), the disability from holding office,
and public advertisement of the offense. Id. at 2808. The Court inferred from this that
the First Congress
considered forfeiture to be a method of punishment. Id. Also found significant by the
Court was the statute's use of forfeit in the same sense that fine is used modernly. Id
The Court noted that dictionaries at the time used the words forfeit and fine
interchangeably. Id. at 2808 n.7.
Less persuasive was the Court's analysis of prior Supreme Court decisions which
addressed whether civil in rem forfeiture statutes imposed punishment. The Court
concluded that its prior cases "recognized that statutory in rem forfeiture imposes
punishment." Id. at 2808. The Court glossed over its prior cases' reliance on the guilty
property fiction by stating that those cases recognized a dual justification of forfeiture
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The Court then turned to consider whether forfeitures under 21

U.S.C. §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) were punitive in nature.Y14 The
Court answered in the affirmative. In support of this decision, the
Court cited three reasons. First, the Act expressly provided for an
innocent owner's defense. 75 Such a defense, the Court reasoned,
"serve[s] to focus the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a
7
way that makes them look more like punishment, not less."1 1
Secondly, the Court concluded that civil forfeitures under the Act

were punishment because of the direct connection between the
forfeiture and a criminal drug offense." Finally, the Court examined
the legislative history of the Act.' 7 The Court found that Congress
enacted the Drug Control Act because traditional criminal measures

were not providing sufficient deterrence.'7

The United States attempted to argue that the Act's provisions were
remedial instead of punitive."s The Court rejected the government's
arguments. Even if the sections at issue were construed as partially
serving a remedial purpose, the Court asserted, but also served some

statutes - "that the property itself is 'guilty' of the offense, and that the owner may be
held accountable for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property." Id. Both
theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing
his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence. Id.
The Court neglected to explain why it had consistently refused to extend Eighth
Amendment protection to statutory in rem forfeitures prior to Austin.
174.
Id. at 2810.
175.
Id. Section 881(a) (4) (C) provides that "no conveyance shall be forfeited
under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C)
(1988). Section 881 (a) (7) provides that 'no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
.or consent of that owner." Id. § 881(a) (7).
176.
Austin, 113 S. CL at 2810-11.
177.
Id. at 2811. The Court based its conclusion that forfeiture under the Act was
conditioned on a direct tie to a commission of drug offenses by referring to
§§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7). Seesupra note 173.
178.
Id. at 2811.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. Specifically, the government argued that the Act's provisions are
remedial. The Court was not persuaded, reasoning as follows:
First they remove the "instruments" of the drug trade "thereby
protecting the community from the threat of continued drug
dealing." Second, the forfeited assets serve to compensate the
Government for the expense of law enforcement activity and for its
expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug
addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug trade.
Id. (citations omitted); see also infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of the Supreme Court's rejection of the above argument).
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retributive or deterrent purposes, then it "is punishment, as we have
come to understand the term."'8 '
The majority concluded its opinion by declining Austin's request to
establish a multi-factor test to determine when a forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 1 2 Instead, the
Court left 83for the lower courts "to consider that question in the first
instance."
V. ANALYSIS

A.

Criticism of Austin
The Austin decision provides a unique opportunity to correct the
abuses which are currently inherent in civil forfeiture statutes while
maintaining the underlying remedial objective of removing the
economic incentive of pursuing certain highly lucrative criminal
activity. Civil forfeiture statutes are abused when they are used against
individuals in situations where the value of the property forfeited is
vastly greater than the severity of the injury inflicted by the criminal
activity or of the costs incurred by the government in enforcing the
statute.'8' This situation is perpetuated, if not created, by focusing
on the culpability of the property.
The major fault with the Austin decision is that the Court partially
relied on precedents with common law roots which are no longer
valid. For example, the Court disingenuously argued that its previous
decisions had implicitly recognized that the guilty property fiction was
implemented, at least in part, as a means to punish property owners.8' This approach encourages the lower courts to avoid under-

181.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448
(1989)); see also supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis of the Excessive Fines Clause in Halper).
Austin, 113 S. CL at 2812.
182.
183.
Id.
184.
See Kasten, supra note 30, at 197. Kasten argues:
To the extent that the monetary value of property forfeited through
civil proceedings does not bear a rational relationship to the
government's pecuniary losses incurred in enforcing criminal laws,
and to the extent that a forfeiture does not serve the remedial goal
of depriving criminal offenders of the proceeds of their activities,
the forfeiture serves as a punishment. When a civil forfeiture
punishes, constitutionally established criminal procedures and
safeguards should govern the forfeiture proceeding.
Id.
185.
See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the
Austin decision); see aLso Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin. Justice Scalia
took issue with the majority's conclusion that previous Supreme Court decisions
recognized the punitive aspects of in rem forfeiture statutes. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814
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taking the proper legal analysis. 6 A more direct and honest
approach would have dismissed outright the deodand tradition of
treating property as capable of guilt.
Austin can also be criticized for its refusal to formulate a test to
determine the constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes. Nevertheless, the essential framework necessary to formulate such a test is
provided in the opinion.
B. A Proposed ConstitutionalTest
The first step in fashioning a modem constitutional test for
determining whether a forfeiture is excessive is to acknowledge the
futility of maintaining the fiction that property can be capable of guilt.
It should be acknowledged that even though civil forfeiture laws are
defended because they "are often viewed as the only adequate means
to protect against a particular offense,""8 7 it is only by resorting to
the in rem fiction that these statutes have survived constitutional

(Scalia, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Scalia wrote:
In my view... the caseload is far more ambiguous than the Court
acknowledges. We have never held that the Constitution requires
negligence, or any other degree of culpability, to support such
forfeitures . ...
A prominent 19th-century treatise explains
statutory in 7em forfeitures solely by reference to the fiction that the
property is guilty, strictly separating them from forfeitures that
require a personal offense of the owner ....
If the Court is
correct that culpability of the owner is essential, then there is no
difference (except perhaps the burden of proof) between the
traditional in rem forfeiture and the traditional in personam forfeiture. Well-established common-law distinction should not be swept
away by bits of dicta. Moreover, if some degree of personal
culpability on the part of the property owner always exists for in ren
forfeitures .... then it is hard to understand why this Court has
kept reserving the (therefore academic) question whether personal
culpability is constitutionally required.
Id. (citations omitted).
186.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Austin illustrates the difficulty encountered when an attempt is made to reconcile out-dated common law principles with
current conditions. As one commentator has noted:
The historical justifications for the personification fiction of civil
forfeiture have been reviewed and appear irrelevant to modem
society. Currentjustifications for the doctrine similarly ring hollow.
The arguments put forth by the courts on this issue are weak and
singularly unconvincing. "The modem doctrine of the offending
res... is a deliberate subterfuge - a judicial fiction, by resort to
which the sovereign, with the sanction of the courts, can impose a
punishment on a blameless individual who is thereby deliberately
left without recourse to his constitutional rights of due process."
Piety, supra note 32, at 977.
187.
State v. 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 487 A.2d 722, 725 (N.J. 1985).
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scrutiny.'88 Moreover, subjecting civil forfeiture statutes to a constitutional analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause is not incompatible
with the statute's traditional objective of deterring certain lucrative
crimes, such as drug trafficking. The deodand doctrine and its
progeny should be discarded entirely and future courts should focus
only on that part of the Austin decision which addresses the issue of
whether a civil forfeiture statute violates the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.
Although the Austin Court declined to explicitly formulate a test to
determine whether a forfeiture is constitutional under the Excessive
Fines Clause, the opinion lays all of the necessary groundwork. The
Court made clear that civil forfeiture statutes are unconstitutional if
they impose punitive fines; only remedial sanctions are permitted. 1s8
The Court chose to adopt a restrictive definition of what constitutes
a remedial sanction. The Court essentially held that forfeitures are
remedial if the property forfeited can be characterized as contraband."° The Court reasoned that seizures of the contraband itself
are remedial, and not punitive, because such seizures "remove[]
dangerous or illegal items from society."1 9' Thus, civil forfeitures of
contraband are remedial in nature, as opposed to punitive, and are
constitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Court flatly rejected the government's argument to expand the
definition of remedial to include seizures of the instrumentalities of
criminal activity.19 The government unsuccessfully argued that the
defendant's mobil home and auto body shop should be subject to
forfeiture because it was an "instrument" of his illegal drug activity.
In dismissing this argument, the Court analogized to One 1958

188.

See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 39, at 258. Finkelstein remarks that:
the doctrine that the sovereign is authorized to impose forfeitures
and confiscations on "guilty things" without regard to the interests
of the innocent owners of those things, is about as irrational and
unjust a proposition as a sober mind can concoct, for all that it has
a history of thousands of years behind it, and has been solemnized
by the United States Supreme Court. But one cannot hope to have
such doctrines abandoned or their inequities remedied until the
demon is tracked down through history to its original contextual
"lair" where it may finally be confronted, identified by its original
name, and only then, effectively exorcised. All else is not much
more than tinkering with the machinery or treating symptoms.

Id. Although the courts have consistently and repeatedly tracked the "demon" to its

"lair," the exorcism has yet to be performed.
189.

Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.

190. Such a conclusion follows from the Court's rejection of the government's
"instrumentalities" argument. Id. at 2811.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 2811-12.
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Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,'9" where the state's seizure of an

automobile was rejected because "[t]here is nothing even remotely
criminal in possessing an automobile."' 9' The Austin Court's holding and its reliance on One 1958 Plymouth Sedan establish that
forfeitures of conveyances and real property used or intended for use
to facilitate the commission of a crime will not survive a constitutional
analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause." 5 However, instrumentalities of manufacturing and distribution of illegal items, which are
themselves illegal, should still be subject to forfeiture.
Austin should also not be interpreted as prohibiting the seizure of
assets acquired from the proceeds of activity specifically targeted by a
civil forfeiture statute. The test as articulated by the Supreme Court
in Austin is whether a forfeiture "removes dangerous or illegal items
from society,"' 96 and whether possession of the item is criminal.197
Such a test would be rendered meaningless if the reach of forfeiture
statutes were restricted to only the contraband itself, and not the
illegally obtained proceeds of the contraband. 98 Also, by subjecting
to forfeiture funds that are traceable proceeds of illegal activity, civil
forfeiture statutes will continue to be an effective weapon in attacking
the profit incentive that makes certain crimes less amenable to
traditional criminal sanctions.
Finally, the Austin Court appears to have rejected civil forfeitures
used to compensate the "[g]overnment for the expense of law
enforcement activity and for its expenditure on societal problems such
as urban blight, drug addiction, and other health concerns resulting
from" criminal

activity."

The Court found the government's

193.
380 U.S. 693 (1965).
One 1958 Plymouth Sedad v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
194.
195.
The holding thus substantially invalidated two provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881.
Section 881 (a) (4) generally provides that a conveyance is forfeitable if it is used to, or
intended for use to, facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, their raw
materials, or the equipment used to manufacture or distribute them. 21 U.S.C.

§ 881(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. II 1991). Section 881(a)(7) subjects real
property to forfeiture if it is used, or intended for use to, facilitate the commission of
a drug-related crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. Id.
§ 881 (a) (7).
196.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811; se also supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's requirement that civil forfeiture statutes be remedial and not
punitive).
197.

Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.

198. See Guerra, supra note 11, at 841-42. The author argues that "[a]s a matter
of necessity as well as principle, civil forfeitures of traceable proceeds should be
permitted." Id. at 241. The author also advocates the creation of safeguards to protect
against the extreme hardship caused by the seizure of essential assets purchased with
proceeds, such as real property and conveyances. Id. at 242.
199.

Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
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proportionality argument unpersuasive due to the "dramatic variations
in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under
§§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7). "2 °° The Court's argument is convincing
because restricting forfeitures to seizures of contraband, and the
proceeds of contraband, intrinsically provides a method of compensating the government. In many cases the value of the confiscated assets
will be greater than the cost of enforcement, thus providing the
government with a windfall. In those cases where the forfeited
property is insufficient to cover governmental enforcement expenditures, the additional fines could only be recovered through additional
forfeiture of assets that are not contraband, which would, under the
Court's reasoning, be punitive rather than remedial.
Proceeding from the foregoing analysis of the Austin decision, a test
to determine whether a civil forfeiture is constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment can be formulated. Under this test, only
contraband and assets obtained from the proceeds of contraband
would be subject to civil forfeiture. This simple test does not rely on
the guilty property fiction, but is based solely on the Austin Court's
conclusion that the Excessive Fines Clause does not permit civil
forfeiture statutes to impose punishment. The only exception to this
rule would apply in circumstances in which in personam jurisdiction
is impracticable or impossible.2"' Under these rare circumstances,
civil forfeiture of property by means of in rem jurisdiction is the only
feasible means of enforcing compliance with criminal statutes. Civil
forfeiture under these circumstances would be consistent with the

200. Id. at 2812.
See, e.g., Austin, 113 S. CL at 2808 n.9 (explaining that the fictions of in rem
201.
forfeiture were developed to expand the reach of the courts where in personam
jurisdiction over the owner of the property may have been available); United States v.
66 Pieces of Jade and Gold Jewelry, 760 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that a
court proceeding in a forfeiture action without in personam jurisdiction would be
unable to effectuate a remedy if it lost control of the property because it lacks the
power to order the property owner to return it); United States v. $3,000,000 Obligation
of Qatar Nat'l Bank, 810 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the state trial
court's use of in remjurisdiction to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
in personam jurisdiction); United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F. Supp.
1348, 1351 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (dismissing summarily the argument that the court could
not proceed in a forfeiture action without in personam jurisdiction); Sanders v.
Wiltemp Corp., 465 F. Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dismissing the complaint for lack
of in personamjurisdiction, but granting the plaintiffs motion for attachment in order
to gain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction); Merrill Lynch Gov't Sec. v. Fidelity Mut. Says. Bank,
396 F. Supp. 318, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that it was necessary for the plaintiff to
acquire quasi-in-rem jurisdiction because the defendant resisted in personam
jurisdiction); Rivera v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Go., 55 F.R.D. 166, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(noting the availability of in remjurisdiction to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack of in personam jurisdiction).
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legitimate historical purpose of in rem jurisdiction. It would also be
consistent with the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to limit the government's power to punish.
C. Application of Test to Austin and Pearson Yacht
Application of the proposed constitutional test will eliminate the
abuses which have plagued the enforcement of civil forfeiture statutes.
If the test had been applied to the facts of Pearson Yacht, the forfeiture
of the yacht would have been ruled unconstitutional because the yacht
clearly was not either contraband or obtained from the proceeds of
contraband. The government's attempt to seize the defendant's
mobile home and auto body shop in Austin would have been
unconstitutional for the same reason. Both cases illustrate the
governmental misuse of civil forfeiture statutes to exact punishment
in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil forfeiture statutes, analyzed free of the shackles imposed by
abandoned common law principles, should be justified, if at all, on the
basis of contemporary constitutional principles. Such an analysis leads
to the inescapable conclusion that any government action taken
against property has direct and inevitable consequences for the owner.
Criminal forfeiture's continued survival rests on both a practical and
theoretical underpinning, both of which are flawed. As a practical
matter, proponents of civil forfeiture argue that its admittedly harsh
sanctions are necessary to combat certain intractable social problems
that have proven immune to traditional measures.2 2 But crimes
traditionally targeted by civil forfeiture laws can be effectively attacked
without offending the Constitution.
Civil forfeiture statutes will still allow government prosecution of
criminals who derive the most financial benefit from the illicit drug
trade and for whom criminal statutes have proven the least effective.
For the more mundane instances of illicit drug activities, however,
criminal statutes provide sufficient deterrence.
Common law distinctions between arcane legal doctrines such as in
personam and in rem jurisdiction continue to exist despite the

202.
See McClure, supra note 12, at 419. The author argues that the magnitude
of the drug problem "outweigh[s] the few toes on which the civil forfeiture of assets
will inevitably and harshly step." Id. at 447. Although civil forfeiture of assets which
target drug related offenses have received the most publicity, state and federal statutes
also target other criminally related activity. See supra note 5; see also Evans, supra note
93;JayA. Rosenberg, Constitutional Rights and CivilForfeitureActions, 88 COLUM. L REv.
390 (1988).
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disappearance of the grounds which originally justified the doctrine. 2 °' This is regrettable, particularly when these distinctions are
used as a prop to sanction governmental infringement of individual
constitutional rights. 2°

Civil forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment

is a particularly compelling modem example.
It is clear that civil forfeiture laws are used to circumvent the
constitutional rights of property owners. °
Simply stated, civil
forfeiture statutes are designed to punish the individual property
owner without resort to cumbersome criminal procedures mandated
by the Constitution.2 ° Under the guise of the in rem legal fiction
that inanimate property is capable of committing crime, civil forfeiture
statutes allow prosecutors to circumvent the constitutional rights
ordinarily due the individual by proceeding directly against the
property. But as common sense dictates, and as to which the
individuals affected would surely testify, it is the individual and not the
property who is affected. As stated in Austin, a court should decide
whether a civil forfeiture statute implicates Eighth Amendment
protection by looking at the substance of the statute to determine
whether its effect is to punish the individual.
Stripped of its common law baggage, it is obvious that civil forfeiture
inevitably serves to punish the individual owner. 7 Once the veil of

203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra part II.B.
See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
See generally Piety, supra note 32.
See Stahl, supra note 58. With regard to § 881, Stahl writes:
Section 881 affords defendants substantially less procedural

protections than traditional criminal prosecutions. Particularly
striking is the contrast in burdens of proof. In order to impose

criminal sanctions, the government must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. A civil forfeiture action brought under the Act,
however, places the burden of proof on the defendant. Once a
court finds probable cause to believe that property was involved in
a drug crime, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property was not involved in any illegal activities.
Currency, buildings, land, automobiles, airplanes, ships and other
significant pieces of property have been taken by the government.
Homes and even public housing leaseholds have been forfeited.
Section 881 produces devastating consequences based upon
minimal proof.
Id. at 278-79 (citations omitted). Stahl proceeds to argue convincingly that § 881's
allocation of the burden of proof violates the Due Process Clause. See generaly id. at
279-337.
See Meyer, supra note 7, at 853. The author argues:
207.
Regardless of the remedial purposes that may be served by civil
forfeiture, the end result is punishment. "Forfeiture is considered
a punitive sanction when it is used without regard to actual damage
caused, particularly when the property forfeited is not contraband,
but an asset which the defendant has a legal right to possess," wrote
Kenneth Mann, an expert on white-collar law. When citizens forfeit
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the guilty property fiction is removed, civil forfeiture's constitutional
deficiencies are self evident. More importantly, these deficiencies can
be attacked directly, without device to tortuous arguments which only
serve to prolong the existence of legal doctrines that have long since
outlived their usefulness.

clothes, cars, boats and homes, they are losing assets which are
rightfully and legally theirs.
Id. at 859-60 (citations omitted).
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